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RECENT CASES 61
say that their illegality hinges upon the nature of their actual use.1
2 However,
under any type of statute forbidding gambling devices it is generally held
that a machine is illegal if it pays off in tokens exchangeable for merchandise
or usable for free plays.1
3
The major controversy arises when the only "pay-off" by the machine is
the opportunity to play automatically registered free games obtained by
achieving a certain minimum score. The majority of jurisdictions state that
free games represent amusement and are things of value or property and
therefore fall within the statutory prohibitions 14 or that they fall within this
category because they offer the necessary lure to indulge in a gambling
instinct.1 5 Nevertheless, in a large minority of the jurisdictions the word
"property" in statutes similar to that involved in the case treated here is
construed to mean something more tangible such as goods, chattels, effects,
or choses in action, and is said not to include the trivial free amusement
provided by free plays on a pinball machine.1 6
North Dakota has a unique manner of dealing with gambling devices in that
she prohibits them as lotteries."7 The only case tried under this section to date,
states that a pinball machine for which the player pays a valuable consideration
and receives an opportunity, chiefly dependent upon chance, to win a prize
or award which is property, is a lottery as prohibited by law.' 8 In holding
in this manner, the court declared that the exclusive right to operate an
amusement device was a form of property. In short, pinball machines are illegal
under North Dakota law if they award free games. However, the statute has
not been vigorously enforced in this state.
RIc ARD V. WxcxA
INSURANCE-RISKS AND CAUSES OF Loss-Is THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF
RADIUM BURNS AN ACCIDENTAL INtJUY?-Plaintiff entered into a contract to
supply a manufacturing concern with a patented process, materials and
equipment for producing a radioactive ointment. An employee of the
manufacturer sued plaintiff in tort for radium burns suffered over a period
of several months while the employee was operating an emanator used in
the production of the ointment. It was alleged that plaintiff was negligent in
12. State v. Wiley, 232 Iowa 443, 3 N.W.2d 620 (1942); State v. Six Slot Machines,
166 Kan. 361, 201 P.2d. 1039 (1949); State v. Hightower, 156 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941).
13. E.g. Giomi v. Chase, 47 N.M. 22, 132 P.2d 715, 718 (1942); Commonwealth v.
Bowman, 267 Ky..602, 102 S.W.2d 382 (1936).
14. State v. Wiley, 232 Iowa 443, 3 N.W.2d 620 (1942); Commonwealth v. Rivers,
323 Mass. 379, 82 N.E.2d 216 (1948); Giomi v. Chase, 47 N.M. 22, 1.32 P.2d
715 (1942).
15. Painter v. State, 163 Tenn. 627, 45 S.W.2d 46 (1932).
16. Washington Coin Mach. Ass'n. v. Callahan, 142 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1944); State
v. Waste, 156 Kan. 143, 131 P.2d 708 (1942); In re Wigton, 151 Pa. Super. 337, 30
A.2d 352 (1943).
17. It was provided in 39660, N.D. Comp. Laws (1913), that "the playing of an
amusement device, commonly called a pinball machine, which is played for a consideration
and which offers to the player an opportunity, dependent chiefly upon chance, to win
the right to extended free use of the device for periods of varying duration, is a lottery."
When this section was carried over into the 1943 code, the language quoted above was
not included in the revised section. However, the Notes of the Revision Committee state
that the change in language was not intended to affect the meaning of the statute. N.D.
Rev. Code 112-2401 (1943); N.D. Code Revision Notes 12-2401 (1943).
18. Middlemas v. Strutz, 71 N.D. 186, 299 N.W. 589 (1941).
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failing to inform the employee of the dangers connected with the work.
Defendant refused to defend the plaintiff, contending that the injury was not
within the terms of a general liability policy it had issued to plaintiff because
the injury was not caused by a sudden happening and therefore did not arise
out of an "accident." Plaintiff settled out of court and sued defendant to
recover the costs of the settlement. Held, judgment for plaintiff. Injuries
arising from an accident include those which occur by reason of a series of
unforeseen events which have a delayed effect terminating in an ascertainable
injury. Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. v. Indemnity Insurance Co., 411
I11. 325, 104 N.E.2d 250 (1952).
Recovery has been allowed both in the United States I and England: for
injuries received by a person where a series of events, and not one specific
event, have caused the injury even though it could not be decided which
event was the final cause. This has included recovery for cancer,;i X-ray
burns,I silicosis,-- tuburculosis,"i skin-poisoning,7 gas poisoning N and typhoid
fever.!' In interpreting insurance policies the courts have consistently
construed the teni "accident" liberally in favor of the insured,'' for it is held
that the desire of a business man to protect himself is the main inducement
toward purchasing the insurance."'
Since the middle of the last century all states have passed Workmens
Compensation Acts,' 2 requiring that an injury must be caused by some
1. Zajkowski v. American Steel & Wire Co.: 258 Fed. 9 (6th Cir. 1918).
2. "In a case in which the contraction of disease is the injury for which compensation
is to be given it cannot be material that the disease was contracted by reason of a
succession of scratches suffered over a period of some four months. I am going to quote
from his judgment (Lord Birkenhead) in Innes (or Grant) v. Kynoch (88 L.J.P.C. at
page 87 (1919) "an interval is assumed (perhaps rightly) before the assault, which is
the accident, followed by the infection or contraction of disease, which is the injury."
Here there was a succession of assaults extending from January to April. In April, at
any rate, there resulted an injury; the contraction of the disease was the injury. To my
mind, it is immaterial that the accidents, the scratches, were sustained over successive
periods of time." Burrell & Sons v. Selvage, 90 L.J.K.B. (n.s.) 1340, 1342 -(1921).
3. Boal v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 98 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1918) (improper
ventilation in acid room).
4. King v. Travelers Insurance Co., 123 Conn. 1, 192 Atl. 311 (1937) (insured
dentist received X-ray burns on fingers); "We are of the opinion that, when an unusual,
unexpected, and unforeseen injury or death results from an intentional act of the insured,
the ensuing injury or death is cassed by accidental means," and "the chain of causation
is unbroken and progressive from the start of the first exposure to the breaking of the skin.
It is one continuous accident." Murphy v. Travelers Insurance Co., 141 Neb. 41,
2 N.W.2d 576, 578 (1942) (improper instructions given as to use of machine).
5. Jones v. Rinehart, 113 W.Va. 414, 168 S.E. 482 (1933) (improper ventilation
furnished employees); accord, Globe Indemnity Co. v. Banner Grain Co., 90 F.2d 774,
783 (8th Cir. 1937). In allowing recovery at common law where it was refused under
Workmens Compensation Act the court said, "We think the trial court rightly held that
the word 'accident' in the insurance policy carried the broader meaning."
6. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pioneer Seafoods Co., 116 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1940)
(improper living quarters furnished).
7. Oscar Heineman Corp. v. Standard Surety & Casualty Co. of New York, 289 Ill.
App. 358, 7 N.E.2d 389 (1937) (failure to furnish employees gloves).
8. Pickett v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., 144 Pa. 78, 22 At. 871 (1891)
(insured killed by gas seepage in well).
9. John Rissman & Son v. Industrial Commission, 323 Il1. 459, 154 N.E. 203 (1926)
(employer furnished impure drinking water).
10. Mutual Life Insurance v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U.S. 167 (1923).
11. Siverstein v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 254 N.Y. 81, 171 N.E. 914 (1930);
Bird v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86, 87 (1918),
"Our guide is the reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary business man when
making an ordinary business contract."
12 . 1 Larson, Workmens Compensation Law, §41.00 (1st Ed. 1952).
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unforeseen and unexpected event.' 3 The original \Vorkmens Compensation
Acts did not allow an employee to recover for an occupational disease I ' but
that nile has now been changed by statutory anmendment in forty-four
states.'1
Many jurisdictions have held the Workmen's Compensation Acts to mean
that the accident causing the injury must be a present happening,t or
one traceable to a specific time and place.'- This interpretation has been
broadened by several courts recently.", Each consecutive contact has been
held to be a specific event, thereby allowing recovery as in the principal
case. This reasoning has been applied in eases of pneumonoconiosis,' 9 hand
blisters caused by continuous contact aO and hand rash caused by the use
of harsh soaps. 2 Even in Missouri, where recovery is denied by statute except
where the accident happened suddenly and violently,22 an employee has been
allowed to recover for the loss of the use of his hands caused by blisters -:;
and lead poisoning caused by inhaling impregnated air.2 4 The courts have
held that "suddenly" does not imply "instantaneously," - 5 and even if it
did there is no reason for saying that each contact with the assaulting force
is not sudden and violent even though the injury could not be seen until
after the first few contacts.2 6 This line of reasoning is only necessary in
applying the Workmens Compensation Acts since the definition of "accident"
under the Acts has been limited by statute. The definition has never been
applied to common law accidents except in New York. The courts of New
York have quite often been influenced in rendering a judgment by the
interpretation given to "accident" in the Workmens Compensation Acts
instead of adhering to the common law definition as generally applied
throughout our system of jurisprudence.27 The insurance company in the
13. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Banner Grain Co., 90 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1937) (inhaling
grain dust); accord, Peru Plow Co. v. Industrial Commission, 311 11. 216, 142 N.E.
546 (1924) (recovery under Workmen's Compensation denied where workman's lungs
were filled with dust in shop); Golden v. Lerch Bros., 211 Minn. 30, 300 N.W. 207
(1941) (insurer not liable to employer where workman contracted tuberculosis and
silicosis) (strong dissent); Castly v. City of Eveleth, 173 Minn. 564, 218 N.W. 126
(1928) (fireman contracted pneumonia); Lerner v. Rump Bros., 241 N.Y. 153, 149
N.E 334 (1925) (recovery denied under Workmens Compensation where refrigeration
worker contracted pneumonia).
14. Billo v. Allegheny Steel Co., 328 Pa. 97, 195 AtL 110 (1937) (silicosis).
15. 1 Larson, Workmens Compensation Law, §41.11 (1st Ed. 19.52).
16. Liondale Bleach Works v. Hiker, 85 N.J.L. 426, 89 At. 929 (1914) (recovery
denied where eczema was caused by acids).
17. Taylor Dredging Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co., 90 F.2d 449 2nd. Cir. 1937)
(tuberculosis, recovery denied); Tomnitz v. Employers Liability Assurance Co., 343
Mo. 321, 121 S.W.2d 745 (1938).
18. Aldrich v. Dole, 43 Idaho 30, 249 Pac. 87 (1926).
19. DeFilippo's Case, 284 Mass. 531, 188 N.E. 245 (1933).
20. American Maize Products Co. v. Niehipordick, 108 Ind. App. 502, 29 N.E.2d
801 (1940).
21. Webb v. New Mexico Publishing Co., 47 N.M. 279, 141 P.2d 333 (1943).
22. "The word 'accident' as used in this chapter shall, unless a different meaning is
clearly indicated by the context, he construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen event
happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault and producing at the time
objective symptoms of an injury . . ." Mo.R.S. 1287.020 .(2) (1949).
23. Lovell v. Williams Bros., .50 S.W.2d 710 (Mo.App. 1932).
24. Soukop v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 341 Mo. 614, 108 S.W.2d 86
(1937) (one judge dissented holding the injury an occupational disease).
25. See note 23 supra.
26. See note 24 supra.
27. Jackson v. Employers Assurance Corp., 248 N.Y.S. 207, 182 N.E. 180 (1932).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
principal case cited several New York cases 28 in defense, relying upon
the interpretation given the term "accident" in New York.
At the present time approximately one-third of the states allow recovery
under the common law only if the accident does not come under one of the
categories provided for in the Workmens Compensation Act 20 since the Act
is compulsory as to the specifically enunciated injuries.
The statutes of North Dakota require every employer engaged in a
hazardous enterprise to be covered by the Workmens Compensation Act 30
and no employer so covered is liable in tort for any injuries suffered by his
employees. This pertains to those employers engaged in non-hazardous work
also if they comply with the provisions of the Act.3' While there are no
cases directly in point with the principal case in this state it seems likely that
the North Dakota court would follow Missouri in circumventing any limitations
placed on the term "accident." In a 1941 case 32 the Supreme Court of
North Dakota stated that the term "immediately" as used in a liability policy
did not mean "instantaneously." However, the court refused to further define
the term at that time.
HAnOLD C. LUCKING
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - INJURIES FOR WHICH COMPENSATION MAY
BE HAD - ACTS OF A RECREATIONAL CHARACTER SPONSORED BY EMPLOYER. -
Claimant, a member of the General Electric Athletic Association, a member-
ship corporation open only to employees of the General Electric Company; sus-
tained a fracture of the left ankle during a game held on company property.
Held, claimant was entitled to an award of Workmen's Compensation since
the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. Tedesco v. Gen-
eral Electric Co., 305 N.Y. 544, 114 N.E.2d 33 (1953).
The dismissal of the claim by the Appellate Division was based mainly
on the precedent of Matter of Wilson v. General Motors Corp., An examination
of the facts of that case makes it obvious that it has no sound application to
the instant case. In the case of Wilson v. General Motors the, employees of a
plant had organized a softball league, conducting games after hours and off
the premises for their own recreation and without any business advantages
to the employer. Though the employer did permit conferences relating to
28. Jacobson v. Employers Assurance Corp., 259 N.Y. 559, 182 N.E. 180 (1932);
Lerner v. Rump Bros., 241 N.Y. 153, 149 N.E. 334 (1925); Jefferys v. Charles H. Sager
Co., 233 N.Y. 535, 135 N.E. 907 (1922).
29. 1 Larson, Workmens Compensation Law, 167.10 (1st Ed. 1952).
30. "Employers who comply with the provisions of this chapter shall not be liable to
respond in damages at common law or by statute for injury to or death of any employee,
wherever occurring, during the period covered by the premiums paid into the fund."
N.D.Rev. Code, 065-0428 (1943).
31. "Any employer carrying on any employment not classed as hazardous under the
definition of that term contained in section 65-0102 who complies with the provisions of
this title and who shall pay into the fund the premiums provided for under this chapter
shall not he liable to respond in damages at common law . . . for injuries to or the death
of any employe. . . . during the period covered by such premiums, if the injured employee
has remaincd in the service of such employer with notice that the employer has paid into
the fund the premiums provided for under the provisions of this title. The continuation
in the service of such employer with such notice shall constitute a waiver by the employee
of his right of action as aforesaid." N.D.Rev. Code, §65-0429 (1943).
32. Jacobson v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n., 70 N.D. 566, 296 N.W.
545 (1941) (the statement, "The insurer shall be liable only for such accidental iniuries
as shall immediately . . . disable the insured." appeared in the policy).
1. 298 N.Y. 468. 48 N.E.2d 781 (1949).
